When “Access to Justice” Stops at the Prison Gate

Published: 10 February 2026

In the final weeks before dissolution of the Scottish Parliament, correspondence was sent to MSPs and committee offices raising a narrow but significant problem in Scots criminal justice: what practical remedy exists after sentence has been served when serious doubt later emerges, and the materials needed to prove it are priced out of reach?

The replies received were procedural rather than substantive. Committees cited agreed work programmes and the limited time remaining in the session.
The issue was not rejected. It was deferred.

That distinction matters, because the underlying problem remains.

The gap after sentence

Scotland prosecutes historic allegations many years after the events. In some cases, sufficiency is reached through pattern-based reasoning, where multiple allegations are treated as mutually reinforcing even where none would stand alone.

This is not an argument against investigating genuine complaints. The justice system must be capable of prosecuting wrongdoing that is not captured by a single isolated incident, and genuine victims are entitled to serious investigation and justice.

But once proceedings are over, and particularly once a sentence has been served, a different question arises: what mechanism exists to independently scrutinise how a case was built when serious doubt later emerges?

For many people, there is no effective route at all.

The practical barrier no one wants to own

Any post-conviction challenge begins with the same requirement: access to the official record.

Transcripts, productions, and core court materials are not optional extras. They are the foundation of any attempt to examine evidential sufficiency, disclosure decisions, or investigative strategy.

Yet for people leaving custody, often unrepresented and without resources, these materials are frequently priced beyond reach. Without them, errors cannot be identified and remedy cannot be pursued. At that point, access to justice exists only in theory.

How transcript reform got misframed

Public discussion around free or subsidised transcripts has often been framed as supporting complainers and survivors. That advocacy points to real barriers faced by those navigating the justice system and should not be dismissed.

But transcript access is not primarily a support issue. It is a post-conviction remedy issue.

The person who most urgently needs the transcript is the individual against whom the state has exercised its most extreme power: imprisonment.

A complainer is not deprived of liberty.
A complainer does not carry the burden of overturning a conviction.
A complainer does not face licence conditions, registries, or lifelong administrative consequences.

The convicted person does.

When transcript access becomes secondary once a conviction is secured, the system quietly inverts its priorities, placing administrative convenience above effective remedy.

An appeal you can’t afford to prepare is not a safeguard. A remedy you can’t access is not a remedy.

The objection, and the answer

The standard objection is that post-sentence scrutiny risks relitigating cases or undermining complainers.

That misunderstands the point. This is not a bid to reopen trials through Parliament. It is a basic rule-of-law question about whether the state provides a realistic route to remedy after it has exercised coercive power.

Appeals exist. But appeals that cannot be pursued in practice, because the materials required are inaccessible, are safeguards in name only.

What proportionate reform looks like

This does not require dismantling the system. It requires correcting an imbalance.

• Clear, consistent transcript pricing
• Fee caps or waivers in post-conviction contexts
• A presumption of access where materials are sought for review
• Published guidance for unrepresented applicants
• Better correction of downstream records where convictions are overturned or materially undermined

Conclusion

The most telling part of the parliamentary correspondence is what was not said.

No one argued transcripts should be unaffordable.
No one argued remedy should be theoretical.
No one argued that post-sentence scrutiny is illegitimate.

The issue was simply postponed.

But postponement does not resolve structural failures, it merely hides them. If the state claims the authority to imprison, it must accept the obligation to provide a meaningful route to scrutiny and remedy, even after sentence has been served.

Access to justice cannot stop at the prison gate.

Editorial note: Accused.scot is an independent commentary site focused on justice process, evidence, and fair-trial principles in Scotland. Our work critiques systems, policy, and public discourse, not private individuals. We welcome reasoned challenge to our arguments. We do not engage in personal disputes or online pile-ons.